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CHOOSE THE BEST ANSWER: ORGANIZING 
CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATION IN THE 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
Jonathan Zasloff* 
Bureaucratic reorganization may well constitute the most dismal 
swamp of policy analysis.  Agencies are restructured, responsibilities reas-
signed, bureaus renamed, boxes are moved around—yet all too often, noth-
ing happens.  This failure, of course, leads to yet another fruitless round of 
thrashing about. 
But organizational choices matter.  At the start of the War on Terror, 
President Bush made two crucial decisions: he gave the CIA (rather than 
the FBI) control over the interrogations of high-value terror suspects1 and 
he gave the Defense Department (rather than State) control of postwar Iraqi 
reconstruction.2  These choices carried disastrous results.  Bush‘s earlier de-
cision to grant Vice President Dick Cheney essentially free rein throughout 
the executive branch also had critical consequences for the substantive out-
comes of his administration.3 
So it is with international climate change negotiations.  Which Ameri-
can agency or entity would be the most capable choice to design effective 
international climate change architecture?  This Essay examines the usual 
suspects—the Department of State, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Council on Environmental Quality, a ―Climate Czar,‖ and a special cli-
mate change representative—and considers the advantages and pitfalls of 
each. 
I conclude, however, that the (tentatively) best choice is one never 
mentioned by commentators: the Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR).  Although USTR does not perfectly fit the task, it has 
fewer shortcomings than other available agencies.  While hardly without 
problems, the USTR represents the best maximization of advantages and 
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I. THE NATURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATION 
Before assessing alternatives, it makes sense to understand the nature 
of climate change negotiation more fully.  Put another way, which characte-
ristics of climate change negotiation bear relevance to its bureaucratic 
home? 
Saliency.  This Essay takes the normative position that mitigating and 
adapting to climate change is a policy challenge of supreme and fundamen-
tal importance.  The science is not in doubt: even the most optimistic scien-
tific assessments predict severe losses and dislocations over the next several 
decades as a result of climate change.4  Those commentators, however, who 
use a very high discount rate may not be persuaded by this analysis.5 
The Two-Level Game.  Climate change differs from other types of in-
ternational negotiations, such as arms control, because it is also a domestic 
issue.  Global collective action problems require international coordination 
as well as a strong domestic political coalition in order to get the appropri-
ate commitments to emissions reductions or carbon pricing.  Successful 
climate negotiation will require adept maneuvering within the ―two-level 
game‖ that Robert Putnam famously described two decades ago.6  Assign-
ment of the climate change brief to any agency unable to mobilize or ap-
pease domestic constituencies stands little chance of success. 
Breadth of Economic Impact.  Perhaps no regulatory scheme will affect 
as many sectors as deeply as climate change regulation and thus require the 
involvement of a wide range of interest groups.  Analysis has focused ap-
propriately on energy and transportation sectors; they will have a powerful 
interest in climate change issues, as will the many industries that depend on 
energy and transportation industries. 
Moreover, the politics are extremely difficult because climate change 
represents a classic case of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits.  Certain 
U.S. industries—particularly auto, steel, cement, and energy—will face pro-
found adjustment challenges to any new climate change regime.  But many 
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skilled political entrepreneurialism to build broad support for a highly tech-
nical topic without immediate and sharp impact.7 
To address the breadth of industries involved, the bureaucratic struc-
ture would require the ability to coordinate and work with a wide variety of 
constituencies and executive agencies as well as strong connections with 
Congress.  Any one agency will not have the institutional competence to 
comprehend the issue alone, and the economic impact of regulations means 
that Congress will take a keen interest in policing the issue. 
Iterations.  While climate change itself is highly complex, the negotia-
tion of a treaty seems comparatively less so, especially because the Kyoto 
cap-and-trade model requires only an emissions target, not a series of spe-
cific actions.  Indeed, that seems to be the point of the policy tool: individu-
als, firms, and nations can determine how to maximize efficiency better 
than international regulators.  However, designing an ongoing climate 
change regime includes several challenges. 
First, a climate change treaty will have a finite life, requiring major pe-
riodic changes in response to scientific and economic developments.  Cli-
mate change negotiations thus fundamentally differ from the Montreal 
Protocol, which ―represent[ed] a diplomatic breakthrough‖ and is ―widely 
thought of as a successful and appropriate response to the threats posed by 
ozone depletion.‖8  One can easily envision the climate change regime 
comprising a series of rounds to grapple with new data and technology. 
Second, the task of monitoring nations‘ compliance, and establishing 
monitoring procedures, will require detailed, drawn-out, and regularly re-
considered provisions. 
Third, the emerging climate change regime might well comprise a se-
ries of overlapping and inconsistent institutions.  The Kyoto Protocol‘s fail-
ure to achieve emissions reductions from the major greenhouse gas emitters 
suggests the need for new approaches.  The negotiation of international sec-
toral agreements within specific industries might be fruitful,9 as might mul-
tilateral (yet nonuniversal) compacts that could construct a regime from the 
bottom up. 
The No Line Authority Advantage.  Though an international climate 
negotiator will face many challenges, it will not be responsible for direct 
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agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Department of Energy (DOE), both of which have the experience and infra-
structure necessary to enforce regulatory requirements. 
The Heads Banging Against Wall Disadvantage.  International climate 
change negotiation has failed in large part due to the inability of the devel-
oped nations to reach an accommodation with India and China.  India and 
China have refused to accept any binding emissions caps, and so far have 
seemed immovable because of economic development priorities and re-
sentment against the United States for what they see as unfair American in-
sistence that they cap their emissions when they did not cause the problem.  
This suggests the necessity of trading across issue areas.  While India and 
China are not eager to regulate emissions now, there are other issues that 
they are eager to address.10 An agency with the capacity and incentives to 
look beyond climate change policy would thus be well-placed to make 
progress. 
II. THE USUAL SUSPECTS 
In light of these factors, this section scrutinizes the agencies most typi-
cally mentioned as likely candidates for leading negotiations and outlines 
their strengths and weaknesses. 
A. The State Department 
Since climate change involves international negotiations, it stands to 
reason that State should have authority in the area.  Congress seemed to feel 
that way in 1987, when it assigned responsibility to Foggy Bottom.11  Cer-
tainly, the Department‘s longstanding expertise in international diplomacy 
and intelligence make it a reasonable choice. 
However, State‘s preeminence also raises substantial problems.  Like 
all Cabinet Departments, it performs poorly at interagency coordination, 
and since Kyoto, it seems to have completely ignored the statutory mandate 
for coordination.  Without such capacity, State will be completely unable to 
trade across issue areas. 
Such inefficacy might stem from the way climate change has been 
submerged in the Department‘s bureaucracy.  The highest official who can 
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secretary for Global Affairs, a third (or even fourth) tier position12—a recipe 
for impotence.  Even the once-prestigious Policy Planning Staff has been 
eclipsed by the proliferation of agencies and in-house think tanks.13 
In any event, climate change does not loom large on Foggy Bottom‘s 
radar screen: prestige comes from nuclear proliferation, counterterrorism, 
political affairs, and the like.  The Department itself did not establish an 
Undersecretaryship for Economic Affairs until Congress mandated it in 
1972, and its willingness to bargain away international economic issues led 
Congress to create USTR‘s predecessor in 1962.14  The Undersecretary for 
Global Affairs can hardly stand up against the combined weight of the De-
partment‘s regional bureaus, which often block even the highest-level State 
initiatives.15  The problem figures only to get worse in subsequent years be-
cause the most far-reaching ideas for enhancing the Department‘s capacity 
and workload lie not with the environment, but rather in ―civilian instru-
ments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign 
assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.‖16 
Finally, State‘s relationships with both Congress and critical consti-
tuencies range from nonexistent to hostile.  The Republican Party‘s antipa-
thy to State carries a proud lineage from Joe McCarthy to Newt Gingrich17; 
even in the midst of massive defense buildups, State‘s budget has been cut 
repeatedly.  Domestic constituencies might not regard Foggy Bottom as an 
enemy, but they hardly see it as a friend.  Instead, it merely is not a force to 
be reckoned with. 
B. The Environmental Protection Agency 
If State is a poor choice, the obvious alternative is the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which not only has vast technical expertise on 
climate change issues, but would be less likely to dismiss the issue than 
State.  Moreover, current federal law gives the EPA the authority to regulate 
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negotiating climate change should have intimate knowledge of how emis-
sions reductions work in practice.  And unlike State, EPA personnel have 
established important connections with key members and committees in 
Congress. 
The EPA should be part of any U.S. negotiating strategy, however, the 
agency should not lead the process.  The EPA‘s Office of International Af-
fairs is a comparatively tiny unit within its massive bureaucracy.  EPA per-
sonnel have never had to negotiate a treaty.  Therefore, it has few if any 
connections with similar organizations or constituencies in other countries.  
While the EPA does serve as the principal U.S. representative to the 
NAFTA Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the Commission has 
become famous for its inefficacy.19 
Perhaps even more importantly, the EPA could hardly be credible do-
mestically as the lead agency.  Since international climate negotiations 
could involve binding commitments for emissions reductions, the suspicion 
could arise that the EPA would essentially be delegating regulatory authori-
ty to itself, destroying its credibility as an honest broker.  Additionally, the 
agency‘s connections to domestic constituencies are often hostile.  Emitters 
of greenhouse gases are also emitters of criteria pollutants, and their interac-
tions with the agency usually take the form of hostile comments in a rule-
making record and dueling briefs in the D.C. Circuit.  To some extent, this 
is as it should be if EPA takes its enforcement responsibilities seriously.  
But it hardly serves as a promising template for negotiators to learn exactly 
how much industries can or cannot reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Finally, the EPA is poorly designed for interagency cooperation.  Its 
own statutory mandates are so strong and complex that is unable to accom-
modate other agencies‘ perspectives.  For example, as the Massachusetts v. 
EPA20 Court noted, despite the EPA‘s protests that domestic climate change 
regulation would undercut foreign policy goals, the agency never managed 
to consult with the State Department.21 
C. The Council on Environmental Quality 
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)—the agency within the 
Executive Office of the President (EOP) whose mission is to coordinate ex-
ecutive branch environmental efforts—could be a viable candidate with a 
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hicle for administering their pet projects.  George W. Bush has used it as his 
principal environmental enforcer: for the last eight years, its staff has 
moved aggressively to delete and distort scientific conclusions, particularly 
about climate change, in the President‘s Annual Environmental Quality Re-
port.23  Thus, to the extent that the CEQ has succeeded in knocking heads in 
the executive branch under Bush, it might do so again under a President 
who takes climate change seriously.  And while mere geography can be 
overstated, the CEQ‘s presence within the EOP might have a marginal ben-
efit in gaining the President‘s ear. 
Yet, despite the CEQ‘s mandate to coordinate federal activities and set 
overall policy, there is precious little evidence that it has actually done so.  
A recent comprehensive look at environmental policy inside the White 
House mentions the CEQ only once and only in passing.24  Even careful 
readers of the scholarly and popular literature will have to look hard for an-
ything that can be regarded as a CEQ accomplishment or signature initia-
tive. 
Perhaps this invisibility simply reflects that the CEQ has the weak-
nesses of its strengths: as an EOP agency, it cannot hope to have the bu-
reaucratic ballast and power of a Cabinet agency or independent 
commission.  Size also matters.  With only twenty-four employees,25 the 
CEQ cannot hope to have any staying power, institutional memory, or long-
term political strength. 
D. The Climate Czar 
Another possible solution, which journalists started talking up less than 
24 hours after the election, is a ―Climate Czar.‖26  Al Gore was mooted as 
an ―ambassador-at-large‖ for climate change, and the Great Mentioner27 
brought up Arnold Schwarzenegger.  Finally, Barack Obama settled on 
former EPA Administrator Carol Browner, who has close ties to Gore. 
Special White House offices without statutory mandates, however, are 
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President (EOP) simply bureaucratizes the White House.  As the EOP gets 
bigger, the more it begins to resemble the very Cabinet agencies that it was 
designed to transcend.28   
Even more importantly, special White House offices have no institu-
tional memory and are often blocked by cabinet departments jealous of their 
turf.  When Tom Ridge became the White House homeland security ―czar‖ 
in 2001, he quickly found himself stymied within the bureaucracy and 
worked to gain statutory authority.  That effort, too, was blocked in the ex-
ecutive branch until it became clear that Congress was going to pass legisla-
tion establishing a new Homeland Security Department.29 
One might suppose that the ―czar problem‖ could be avoided because it 
would be a negotiating position, not an enforcement or line authority posi-
tion.  Thus, a special representative would not have the same problems as 
Ridge, whose brief required him to intrude on the day-to-day workings of 
other departments.  In contrast, ozone negotiations were effectively con-
ducted by a special representative.30 
Even though the climate change negotiator will not have to intrude in-
side other departments, it will have to get departments to agree on negotiat-
ing positions.  The climate change negotiator will not administer 
agricultural subsidies, for example, but it will have to convince the infa-
mously captured Agriculture Department to agree to reduce them. That will 
require expertise at the sort of bureaucratic infighting that a free-standing, 
new climate negotiator will not have.  Ozone serves as a good comparison.  
The Montreal Protocol negotiations involved nowhere near the scope of in-
terest that climate change does; it involved only a handful of major chemi-
cal firms and did not need to address other departments. Climate change 
will. 
The Montreal Protocol was also essentially a one-shot deal.  Follow-up 
agreements and enforcement have been necessary, but commentators can 
refer credibly to the success of the regime because the negotiations 
achieved their goal.31  Climate negotiation will require far more intense, 
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ades or longer.  That means that it needs to have bureaucratic heft over sev-
eral administrations.  No ambassador-at-large—even a former Vice 
dent and Nobel Prize winner, or Terminator—will be able to accomplish 
that. 
III. AN UNUSUAL SUSPECT: THE OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE 
Alternatively, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), while 
hardly perfect, may be right for the job.  USTR is a unique agency.  Located 
within the Executive Office of the President, it is second-largest of all EOP 
agencies, and Congress has made it ―responsible for developing and coordi-
nating U.S. international trade, commodity, and direct investment policy, 
and overseeing negotiations with other countries.  The head of USTR is the 
U.S. Trade Representative, a Cabinet member who serves as the president‘s 
principal trade advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson on trade issues.‖32 
Such an express statutory mandate gives USTR institutional strength, 
but the agency‘s mission is also particularly revealing.  The USTR does not 
implement or enforce trade or investment deals and has no line authority.  
Instead, its challenging task is to achieve a unified American position on in-
ternational trade talks.  It does this through two key bodies: the Trade Poli-
cy Staff Committee (TPSC) and the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG).  
USTR chairs and administers these groups, which comprise nineteen feder-
al agencies and offices.  The TPSC, the primary operating group, has repre-
sentation at the senior civil service level.  More than ninety subcommittees 
responsible for specialized areas and several task forces working on particu-
lar issues support the TPSC.  If the TPSC does not reach agreement, or if an 
issue involves significant policy questions, the TPRG (Deputy USTR, Un-
der Secretary level) takes up the issue.  If agencies still cannot reach agree-
ment, then issues are resolved in the White House.33 
This interagency process resolves issues at the lowest possible level 
and leaves the most intractable issues for resolution by the most accounta-
ble policymakers.  But USTR is more than a mere convener.  ―[I]n practice, 
USTR dominates the bureaucratic process due to informational asymme-
tries arising from its primary responsibility for policy implementation,‖ and 
although it does not chair the White House committee, the agency ―remains 
the most influential single voice due to its bureaucratic stake in trade policy 
formation and implementation.‖34 
Thus, coordinating and resolving interagency disputes represents a 
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advantage over other candidates to run climate change negotiations.  Given 
USTR‘s other major role—conducting trade negotiations—the agency hard-
ly takes a back seat to State in diplomatic competence.  But how can we ex-
pect an agency with neither substantive expertise nor interest in 
environmental issues to be an effective negotiator or coordinator?  Why 
should anyone at USTR care about climate? 
A. USTR as Goldilocks: Just the Right Size 
First, consider the USTR‘s size and structure.  While it is large for an 
EOP agency, at roughly 200 employees, it is small compared to Cabinet de-
partments and the ratio of political appointees to civil servants is quite 
high.35  A President committed to adding climate change to the USTR‘s 
brief, then, can do so through the appointments process.  Movement con-
servatives have long embraced the motto, ―personnel is power,‖36 and they 
are basically right: getting the appropriately ―committed‖ people in the right 
positions can move the bureaucracy.  Indeed, one key reason for Dick Che-
ney‘s unprecedented authority lay in his ability to place key supporters in 
previously unheralded positions.37 
While it is possible that USTR civil servants would attempt to subvert 
its new expanded role, it is unlikely.  The agency‘s relatively small size 
means that initiatives from political appointees cannot get lost within laby-
rinthine bureaucratic halls because, quite literally, those halls do not exist.  
The USTR‘s mandate seems to have created, at least for climate change ne-
gotiation purposes, an administrative sweet spot—large enough to have 
weight, but not so large as to become unwieldy.  Accordingly, academic ac-
counts and personal anecdotes reveal that individual trade representatives 
make a huge difference in the day-to-day workings and culture of the agen-
cy. 
B. Issue Trading and Bureaucratic Incentives 
Adding climate change to the USTR might contribute to the facilitation 
of trade and investment agreements, giving long-time USTR personnel a 
powerful reason for embracing their new mission.  Climate change would 
contribute to the USTR‘s ability to trade across issues.  More than twenty 
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tional regimes because such organizations would foster issue trading.38  
Agreements are costly; one institution capable of bringing parties together 
on different issue areas would reduce the costs of finding mutual beneficial 
deals. 
Keohane‘s insight applies particularly well to the climate-trade inter-
face.  Talks may have broken down between the United States and develop-
ing countries on two issues, but combining might change the political 
calculus.  The Doha Round of trade talks broke down when India and other 
developing countries insisted on automatically restraining agricultural im-
ports if such imports became too great for them—a device already used by 
developed nations.  American and European refusals to accept such a de-
mand—no doubt brought about by domestic agricultural lobbies—created 
the impasse.  On the climate side, the United States has refused to adhere to 
any climate treaty in which India, China, and other developing nations 
refuse to accept binding carbon emissions. 
We might imagine a deal in which China and India agree to impose a 
moderate carbon tax (not a binding limitation) in exchange for American 
acceptance of the agriculture trigger.  The United States might agree to such 
a trade-off because the prospect of some Indian and Chinese climate regula-
tion would promise major benefits for American firms.  With new EPA pol-
icy and various state initiatives, domestic climate change regulation is 
coming and American industry will want to level the playing field.  Trade 
concessions might be the way to do so. 
Less optimistically, USTR supervising climate change negotiations 
would also be far more capable of threatening border tax adjustments 
(BTAs) for carbon footprints than either a special climate change negotiator 
without any trade authority or the State Department.  The trade rules con-
cerning BTAs are complex and malleable, and developing the appropriate 
record to use them for climate purposes will be critical.  For example, Joost 
Pauwelyn has suggested that in order for climate-based BTAs to pass legal 
muster, a nation proposing to impose them should demonstrate that it has 
made a good faith effort to negotiate a climate accord.39  An agency with the 
requisite expertise before tribunals such as the WTO Appellate Body will 
best handle defining ―good faith‖ and the steps necessary for persuading 
such tribunals. 
Indeed, placing climate negotiating authority with USTR might also 
―green‖ international trade law.  Since the WTO Appellate Body constitutes 
one of the few truly effective international lawmaking institutions, leverag-
ing WTO enforcement authority potentially constitutes an enormous gain 
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All of this points to an overarching fact: as an issue, climate change 
looks a lot like trade.  Both issues involve a complex series of negotiations 
where overall international welfare would be enhanced by a particular poli-
cy (free trade and a comprehensive carbon reduction regime), but collective 
action problems and unequal distribution of costs and benefits often prevent 
agreement.  In the language of international theory, both issue areas involve 
large stakes for both absolute and relative gains.  In contrast, traditional in-
ternational security issues predominantly concern relative gains.40  If we 
peer inside states themselves, both trade and climate change affect powerful 
domestic constituencies that also influence political processes.  While 
groups might vehemently disagree about national security policy, those dis-
agreements revolve around ideology and perceptions of the national inter-
est, not rent-seeking interest groups. 
Thus, climate change and international economic policy will generate 
profitable issue trades.  Keohane argues that institutions can promote coop-
eration where there exists suitable ―issue density‖ to allow for trading 
across issue areas.41  This notion of density, however, implies a fit or equi-
valence between issues that generates tradeability.  Climate and trade have 
this sort of fit.  Thus, USTR personnel should embrace their new role be-
cause they will receive strong guidance from political appointees and be-
cause it will assist them in pursuing their traditional role. 
IV. REORGANIZATION AND THE NATIONAL ENERGY COUNCIL 
Climate policy‘s connection to national energy strategy has led some to 
suggest reorganizing government departments altogether.  For example, Ri-
chard Haass has argued that the government‘s entire energy portfolio 
should be reorganized into one strong agency because ―energy policy is na-
tional security policy.‖42  The politics of the next two or three years, howev-
er, strongly counsels against doing so. 
The United States is now heading into what figures to be a long and 
deep recession.  The country is mired in two wars.  Unless the nation can 
reorganize its health care system, which currently comprises 16% of GDP,43 
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In these circumstances, it hardly seems wise for a new administration 
to spend political capital in a highly partisan environment on bureaucratic 
reorganization.  Haass himself concedes, ―it is rarely a good idea to remodel 
the operating room when the patient is on the table.‖44  It makes more sense 
to deliver on those issues that need legislative support rather than climate 
change, where there is already statutory authority. 
Still, creating a new Cabinet department creates vast new accountabili-
ty problems on its own.  Even after Congress created the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), it remained ineffective—in part due to the in-
evitable congressional eagerness to ensure that its new creation did its job, 
an eagerness that helped to ensure that it could not.  DHS had to answer to 
eighty congressional committees and subcommittees.45  Every member of 
the Senate had some sort of oversight responsibility.  Top officials spent 
virtually all of their time testifying, preparing testimony, or responding to 
questions and requests for information from Capitol Hill.46 
What, then, of the proposal for a National Energy Council (NEC)?47  
The NEC, according to its promoters, would ―coordinate the relevant poli-
cies of all agencies of the federal government, outreach with states, locali-
ties, and the private sector, and U.S. leadership and partnership in 
international efforts to reduce global emissions.‖48  First, CAP sees this of-
fice as domestically oriented, specifically noting that its proposal for de-
carbonizing the U.S. economy does not concern ―the complicated set of 
questions concerning the policies and diplomacy needed to bring about a 
low-carbon economy globally.‖49  This makes good sense.  The Herculean 
effort to transform the U.S. economy and federal bureaucracy is large 
enough without also having to conduct perhaps the most complex negotia-
tion in diplomatic history. 
Just as importantly, there is no contradiction between the NEC struc-
ture and giving lead responsibility to USTR.  As noted above, when nego-
tiating trade deals, USTR‘s interagency process funnels top-level issues to 
the NEC.  Lead responsibility does not mean dictatorial power.  Indeed, the 
NEC proposal dovetails nicely with USTR‘s lead role because of USTR‘s 
experience working with White House coordinating committees.  Critical 
international decisions—on trade, climate change, or anything else—will 
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ensure that relevant facts and options are presented most completely and 
fairly, that all players have a chance to have input, that decisionmaking does 
not fall victim to paralysis by analysis, and that the most accountable actors 
actually make the important choices.  Whatever the NEC‘s final status, 
USTR should still play a key role in determining the international dimen-
sions of U.S. climate policy. 
CONCLUSION: CHOOSE THE BEST ANSWER 
Bureaucratic structures hardly ensure optimum policy results.  FDR‘s 
chaotic decisionmaking process produced some of the most successful poli-
cies that the nation has ever seen.  Jimmy Carter‘s careful attention to ex-
ecutive reorganization was overwhelmed by events and his own 
indecisiveness. 
Still, procedure has substantive consequences and can give talented 
politicians the support they need to advance constructive policies.  Climate 
change negotiation has faltered for many reasons.  The Bush Administra-
tion‘s head-in-the-sand approach has done significant damage, but it is too 
facile to solely blame this posture for failure.  Whatever happens to the 
Kyoto process, the next phase of climate diplomacy will be difficult and 
contentious.  In such an atmosphere it makes sense to construct a policy 
process that reduces unnecessary obstacles.  Giving USTR the lead role in 
climate negotiation avoids the risk of an ineffective new White House of-
fice or the virtual certainty of it being buried in far larger Cabinet agencies.  
It also carries the potential of better integrating trade and environment is-
sues.  It thus may not be the perfect answer, but it is the best one. 
